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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 
Jim Kennan S.C.* 
I.  THE ABSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
Australia does not have national legislation embracing a Bill of 
Rights or a Charter of Rights, although the Australian Government has 
currently sponsored a public consultation on whether a Charter should 
be adopted.  There have been attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to 
introduce national human rights legislation but these did not succeed.  
However, a Charter of Rights has been passed in the Australian Capital 
Territory, and in the State of Victoria.  These acts apply only to those 
jurisdictions.  They are similar in operation to the Human Rights Act of 
1998 of the United Kingdom.  The rights in this Act are based on the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Australia signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1981.  It has also signed the Convention on Torture.  
However, the Australian courts have shown little interest in developing 
Australian law by reference to the international charter, but have rather 
preferred to operate within the existing confines of the common law. 
In the case of statutory interpretation, it has been a recognised 
principle in Australia that as a rule of construction, the legislature is not 
to be taken to have intended to legislate in violation of the rules of 
international law existing when the legislation was enacted.  Therefore, it 
is the principle of statutory construction that statutes are to be read 
consistently with the rules of international law, but not where the clear 
words of the statute are inconsistent with that implication.1  However, 
the courts have not generally adopted the principles contained in 
international treaties in the development of the common law.2 
In one of the few positive references by the High Court of Australia 
to the ICCPR, Justice Brennan3 said that the Court could take into 
account the fact of the adherence by Australia to the ICCPR as an 
expression of community values.  That case concerned the right of an 
accused person to be provided with legal counsel at public expense.  The 
High Court held that the law of Australia did not recognise such a right, 
but that if a person was denied legal aid, then the court had the power to 
stay the trial until legal aid was provided if the trial was not going to be 
                                                 
*  Jim Kennan S.C., LLB (Hons) (Melb); LLM (Melb). 
1 See Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 589–90. 
2  Ragg v. Magis. Ct. 179 A. Crim. R. 568, 18 V.R. 300 (Vict. 2008) (the approach of Bell, J. 
in this case has not been adopted elsewhere). 
3 Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 9 (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
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fair in the absence of legal representation.  Justice Brennan referred to 
article 14(3)(d) as a concrete indication of contemporary values and 
referred to the fact that that article provided a right to have legal 
assistance.4  The Judge also referred to the covenant as being a legitimate 
influence on the development of the common law of Australia, although 
it was not part of Australian domestic law.5 
It may be said, however, that these references to the international 
law are the exception rather than the rule in Australia.  The Australian 
courts have preferred to be guided by the general common law principle 
that a trial must be fair rather than by reference to the specific provisions 
of the International Covenant, or relevant international jurisprudence 
which interprets the ICCPR or its European equivalent, the European 
Convention. 
A. The High Court Upholds Lifetime Detention of an Illegal Immigrant  
In Al Kateb, the High Court held that the Migration Act of Australia 
authorised the detention of a non-citizen who had entered Australia 
illegally, even if his removal from Australia was not reasonably 
practicable in the foreseeable future, and that he might spend the rest of 
his natural life in prison.6  Only one justice (Kirby, J.) referred in positive 
terms to the operation of international law, to hold that such a 
construction was wrong.7  Justice McHugh, who was in the majority and 
who argued against the application of international law, did suggest the 
outcome might have been different if Australia had a Bill of Rights.8 
B. The Experience of the Australian and English Courts in the Terrorist Cases 
An examination of the way in which courts in Australia have dealt 
with counter terrorist legislation, and the way in which courts in 
England have dealt with similar issues, is instructive in understanding 
the differences in legal cultures where one jurisdiction acknowledges 
international treaties in the development of the domestic law, and 
another jurisdiction pays only peripheral attention to them.  It is also the 
case that since 1998 the United Kingdom has had the Human Rights 
Act,9 while Australia has none. 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 Id. (citing Mabo v. Queensland [No.2], (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 41). 
6 (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 1 (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.). 
7 Id. at 150, 175, 179 (opinion of Kirby, J.). 
8 Id. at 73 (opinion of McHugh, J.). 
9 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). 
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C. The Right to a Fair Trial 
In Benbrika, the court was faced with a trial of twelve persons 
accused with offences under the Australian terrorist legislation.10  The 
trial was scheduled to take between six and nine months.11  The accused 
had been in custody for almost two years when the trial started in 
February 2008.12  During this time they had been held in the most austere 
conditions in the prison system, including being held up to twenty-three 
hours per day in their cells, with very severe restrictions on receiving 
visitors.13 
The accused had been held at a maximum security prison some 
distance from the court in Melbourne.14  The travelling time, depending 
on the traffic, to and from court was between sixty-five to eighty minutes 
each way.15  The accused were strip searched when they left the prison in 
the morning and again each evening.16  The process of loading them in 
the morning, including the strip searching, took about an hour in 
addition to the travel time.17  The accused were handcuffed and shackled 
during their travel to and from the court.18  At the end of the day, they 
were subject to the same routine.19 
Evidence was called from medical practitioners to the effect that the 
impact on the physical and psychological functioning of someone 
subjected to this regime was that it would have a significant impact on 
memory and concentration, and that it would compromise significantly 
the capacity of the ordinary person to attend to the complex material 
being presented at the trial, as well as hinder the person in assisting in 
his defence.20 
The Judge in the case said that he was satisfied on the evidence that 
the accused were currently being subjected to an unfair trial because of 
these circumstances.21  He ordered that the accused be moved to a prison 
in close proximity to the court, and that the strip searching and shackling 
stop.22  In doing so the judge relied on the common law principles that a 
                                                 
10 R. v. Benbrika (2008) 182 A. Crim. R. 205. 
11 Id. at 4. 
12 Id. at 26. 
13 Id. at 28–31. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 34. 
16 Id. at 33. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 33–34. 
19 Id. at 36. 
20 Id. at 47–67. 
21 Id. at 84–85. 
22 Id. at 99–102. 
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trial must be fair and the power of a court to order a stay of proceedings 
unless the unfairness was remedied.23  
The Judge said that the case could be resolved by the application of 
common law principles, without referring to international instruments, 
although the ICCPR and a number of European cases were referred to in 
argument.24  The interesting point to note is that none of the common 
law cases expressly dealt with the sort of factual situation that 
confronted the court in this case.25  The principles of the common law 
that referred to the right to a fair trial and the power of the court to order 
a stay if unfairness persisted were sufficient to determine the case.26  It 
should be said that this is a landmark decision in the Australian common 
law, but that if international legal principles, such as equality of arms, 
were more generally recognised in Australia, and Australian courts had 
regard to international jurisprudence, then it might not have taken until 
2008 for such a decision to be given, or for such an argument to be 
agitated. 
In contrast to the silence of the common law in Australia (prior to 
Benbrika) on the impact of prison conditions on the capacity of the 
accused to participate in his trial, there were European cases which dealt 
with the issue as to whether or not the conditions in which accused 
persons were held were such that the accused could not properly 
participate in the trial.  In particular, the case of E v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department set out the following principles:27 
• The right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of the rule of 
law. 
• The principle of equality of arms requires that each party be 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under 
conditions that could not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage. 
• The right of an accused person to effectively participate in a 
criminal trial includes the right to hear and follow the 
proceedings. 
• It is a breach of the principle of fairness if the conditions of 
detention and transportation are such that the accused suffers 
from low physical and mental resistance. 
• It is important that the accused be able to participate in the trial 
without being in a state of excessive tiredness. 
                                                 
23 Id. at 90–91. 
24 Id. at 15–20. 
25 Id. at 15. 
26 Id. 
27 E. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (2007) E.W.H.C. 1731 (Q.B.D. Admin). 
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• The question of whether or not the conditions of the trial meet 
the required standards of fairness is a matter for the trial judge. 
This case is an example of how an English court readily felt able to 
embrace the International Law concept of equality of arms, in order to 
develop the common law in England.28  The notion of equality of arms is 
not readily embraced by the Australian common law.29 
II. TORTURE CASES – DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH 
In the case of Thomas, the Victorian Court of Appeal dealt with the 
case of an accused person who had been convicted of receiving funds 
from a terrorist organization.30  He had been interviewed by Australian 
police in Pakistan while he was effectively in the custody of Pakistani 
officials.31  The Court found that he had been told repeatedly by his 
Pakistani interrogators that his fate would depend to a very substantial 
extent on the degree to which he cooperated.32  The Pakistani officials 
had told him that he did have the possibility on the one hand of 
returning to his family in Australia, and on the other hand a very 
different fate.33  They told him that the Australian authorities would only 
be able to assist him if he could be seen to have cooperated fully.34 
The Australian officials did nothing to distance themselves from that 
position.35  The Court also found that he had been emotionally 
manipulated by the Australian police who showed him a photograph of 
his wife and daughter, and a letter from his wife.36  The Court found that 
he had been effectively threatened with indeterminate detention by the 
Pakistanis, in Pakistan or in some other unidentified location.37  He was 
held in a house for about two weeks in a cell the size of a dog kennel and 
was deprived of food and water for about three days.38  He was 
questioned in a room sitting on a low stool with his feet padlocked to a 
large metal plate on the floor, and he was handcuffed behind his back.39  
At one stage a Pakistani officer grabbed his hood by the collar and 
                                                 
28 Id. at 21–22, 60–62. 
29 But see Ragg v. Magis. Ct., (2008) 179 A. Crim. R. 568, 18 V.R. 300 (Vict.) (addressing 
equality of arms in depth). 
30 R. v. Thomas III  (2006) 181 A. Crim. R. 323, 1. 
31 Id. at 2. 
32 R. v. Thomas (2006) 163 A. Crim. R. 567, 71, [2006] V.S.C.A. 165. 
33 Id. at 74. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 76–78. 
37 Id. at 80. 
38 Id. at 12–15. 
39 Id. 
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strangled him so that he was suffocating, and he felt unbearable heat and 
stress.40  After this he was not allowed water.41  He had given evidence 
that he believed that he may be sent to Guantánamo Bay if he did not 
cooperate.42 
A. The Reluctance of Australian Judges to Refer to International Norms and 
Treaties 
The treatment of Thomas would, on the face of it, amount to torture 
or cruel or degrading and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the 
Torture Convention43, and within the meaning of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.44  However, the Victorian Court of Appeal made no 
reference to any international treaties in its judgment, and ruled that the 
record of interview was inadmissible according to common law 
principles because it could not be said to be voluntary.45  Nor did either 
of the other two judges who dealt with the case at the initial trial and on 
the retrial refer to international treaties when considering the 
circumstances of Thomas’s treatment in Pakistan.  The reluctance of 
Australian judges to refer to international law when dealing with a case 
of this kind stands in stark contrast to the approach taken in the United 
Kingdom. 
B. The Contrasting Position in England—The Cases of A and Binyam 
Mohamed 
The difference in legal cultures is highlighted by reference to two 
English cases.  In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2), the 
House of Lords was concerned with a case where the appellants 
appealed against a decision on the basis that their evidence before the 
immigration appeals commission might have been procured by torture 
inflicted by foreign nationals.46  The House of Lords held that the English 
common law had always set its mind firmly against the use of torture 
                                                 
40 Id. at 15. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 10. 
43 See G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), Art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/2433 (Dec. 9, 1975) (defining torture).  
Torture is defined in Article 1 of the Convention to mean:  “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining [information] from him.”  Id. 
44 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
45 R. v. Thomas (2006) 163 A. Crim. R. 567, at 91–94. 
46 A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2) [2006] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
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and had insisted that evidence so obtained was to be excluded.47  The 
Court had regard to the European Convention48 and the International 
Convention Against Torture, 1984.49  It said that the international 
prohibition on the use of torture enjoyed the status of a peremptory 
norm of international law.50 
In the case of Binyam Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, the Queens Bench division of the High Court in 
England, consisting of two judges, dealt with the case of a detainee at 
Guantánamo.51  The detainee said that he had been the subject of 
extraordinary rendition and had been tortured before his removal to 
Guantánamo.52  The proceedings in the High Court in England were 
directed to obtaining discovery from the intelligence agencies in 
England, as to what they knew of his treatment, as it had appeared that 
British agents had some involvement in his interrogation by Pakistani 
authorities and may have some knowledge of his rendition by the United 
States agencies.53  In the course of its judgment, which ordered the 
disclosure of information held by the British government, the Court 
made a number of important observations: 
• The common law had long set its face against torture.54 
• Equally significant was the fact that the prohibition on state 
torture had achieved the status of a peremptory norm in 
international law (the Court referred to the Convention against 
Torture 1984).55 
• The Court gave weight to Article 5 of the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits torture 
or cruel inhumane and degrading treatment, Article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention, which prohibits cruel treatment and 
torture, and other Articles of the conventions which prohibited 
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, and Article 16 of the Convention Against 
                                                 
47 Id. at 11 (opinion of Bingham, L.J.). 
48 Id. at 23–26 (citing European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, as amended by Protocol 11, E.T.S. 155 (1998)). 
49 Id. (citing Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984)). 
50 Id. at 33. 
51 Binyam Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] 
EWHC 2048 (Q.B).  This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales on 10the February 2010.  See [2010] EWCA Civ 65. 
52 Id. at 35–38. 
53 Id. at 60–145. 
54 Id. at 142(i). 
55 Id. at 142(ii). 
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Torture which prohibits cruel inhuman or degrading 
treatment.56 
The Court also held that the United Kingdom Government had 
facilitated the interrogation of the appellant at a time when it knew of his 
treatment in Pakistan, including being held incommunicado and without 
access to a lawyer.57  Such detention was unlawful under the law of 
Pakistan.58  The Court adopted what had been said in the Horseferry Road 
Magistrates Court case.  
There is . . . no principle more basic to any proper 
system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law 
itself.  When it is shown that the law enforcement 
agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only 
been enabled to do so by participating in violations of 
international law and of the laws of another state in 
order to secure the presence of the accused within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court, I think that respect for 
the rule of law demands that the court take cognisance 
of that circumstance.  To hold that the court may turn a 
blind eye to executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers 
of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and 
unacceptable view.59  
It should be noted that this judgment was delivered some time before the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, in the United Kingdom.  The 
English courts had been paying much more attention to international 
law in the development of the common law, than the Australian courts 
did, even well before the enactment of the human rights legislation in the 
United Kingdom. 
C. The Control Order Cases 
In another case concerning Thomas, Thomas v. Mowbray, a 
constitutional challenge was launched in the High Court of Australia, to 
the validity of a control order which had been made under the 
counterterrorism legislation in respect to Thomas.60  The Court upheld 
by a majority the validity of the control order legislation on the basis that 
                                                 
56 Id. at 143. 
57 Id. at 147(vi). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (citing R v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. [1994] 1 A.C. 42 (on appeal from Q.B.) 
(opinion of Bridge, L.J.)). 
60  Thomas v. Mowbray (2007) 233 C.L.R. 307, 81 A.C.J.R. 1414  (Austl.). 
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the legislation was within the defence power of the Australian 
government to protect the nation against aggression from within the 
country, as well as from without,61 and that the conferral of the power to 
make a control order on the judiciary was one that was consistent with 
judicial activities.62  No reference was made to international treaties or 
the ICCPR by the majority in this case. 
There have been a number of decisions of the House of Lords on the 
issue of control orders.  Those decisions have different outcomes, but all 
involved consideration of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the 
European Convention.63 
D. Deference—The Belmarsh Case 
By way of further contrast, the Belmarsh case decided by the House 
of Lords in 2004 showed a robust attitude to the interpretation of counter 
terrorism legislation by a court utilising the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
extensive reference to the European Convention and international law.64 
In that case, the appellants were foreign nationals who were 
detained under the Terrorism Act in the United Kingdom.  The 
Terrorism Act empowered the Secretary of State to issue a certificate in 
respect of foreign nationals whom he reasonably suspected of being 
terrorists or having links with international terrorist groups, and whom 
he reasonably believed to be a threat to national security.65  A person so 
certified could be detained under immigration legislation pending his 
removal from the United Kingdom even if such removal was impossible 
because of the effect of an international agreement, or for practical 
reasons.66  Such a person could, however, agree to leave United 
Kingdom voluntarily. 
The Act did not apply to British nationals.67  The United Kingdom 
had formally notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that 
it found it necessary to take measures in derogation of Article 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds that there was a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation.68 
                                                 
61 Id. at 132–40, 154. 
62 Id. at 121. 
63  See Adam Sandell, Liberty, Fairness, and the UK Control Order Cases:  Two Steps Forward, 
Two Steps Back,, 2008 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 120 (analyzing the right to liberty). 
64 A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
65 Id. at 12 (opinion of Bingham, L.J.) (citing Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 
2001, § 21). 
66 Id. at 13 (citing Anti-Terrorism Act § 22(1)), 14 (citing Anti-Terrorism Act § 23). 
67 Id. at 33–34. 
68 Id. at 10. 
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The appeal was brought on the grounds that there was no public 
emergency, that the measures were not proportionate, and that they 
were discriminated against on the grounds of nationality or immigration 
status.69 
1.  Judicial Deference Did Not Preclude Court Review of the Executive 
Decision 
The House of Lords held by majority that it was appropriate for the 
courts to give weight to the political judgments of the government and 
the Parliament on the question of whether or not there was a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation.70  However, it held that 
judicial deference did not preclude the courts from reviewing the 
compatibility of the measures, with the requirements of the European 
Convention including proportionality.71 
It held that since other measures were adequate to monitor the 
activities of British suspects, it was hard to see why a regime of strict 
restrictions and intensive monitoring would not suffice in the case of 
foreign nationals.72  The court said that the measure failed to adequately 
address the problem and at the same time involved the severe penalty of 
indefinite detention of persons who, even if suspected of having links to 
a terrorist organisation, might have harboured no hostile intention 
towards the United Kingdom.  Since the risk to security emanated from 
both British and foreign nationals, the difference in treatment could not 
be justified.73 
There was no authority to support the proposition that in times of 
emergency, the State may lawfully discriminate against foreign nationals 
by detaining them while not detaining those of its own nationals who 
pose the same threat.74  The measures involved unjustifiable 
discrimination on the ground of nationality or immigration status, 
contrary to Article 14 of the European Convention and Article 26 of the 
ICCPR.75  The United Kingdom had not sought to derogate from these 
articles.  The measures also failed to meet the third requirement of 
Article 15 of the European Convention since they were inconsistent with 
the United Kingdom’s other obligations under international law.76 
                                                 
69 Id. at 45–46. 
70 Id. at 29. 
71 Id. at 38–42.  
72 Id. at 35. 
73 Id. at 68. 
74 Id. at 63. 
75 Id. at 69, 73. 
76 Id. 
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2. A Landmark Decision 
This decision has been said by Lady Mary Arden to be: 
[A] landmark decision that will be used as a point of 
reference by courts all over the world for decades to 
come, even when the age of terrorism has passed.  It is a 
powerful statement by the highest court in the land of 
what it means to live in a society where the executive is 
subject to the rule of law.77 
3. The Observations on Deference 
On the question of the deference by the courts to political authorities 
Lord Bingham said this: 
[I] do not accept the full breadth of the Attorney 
General's argument on what is generally called the 
deference owed by the courts to the political authorities.  
It is perhaps preferable to approach this question as one 
of demarcation of functions . . . .  The more purely 
political . . . a question is, the more appropriate it will be 
for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an 
appropriate matter for judicial decision.  The smaller, 
therefore, will be the potential role of the court.  It is the 
function of political and not judicial bodies to resolve 
political questions.  Conversely, the greater the legal 
content of any issue, the greater the potential role of 
court, because under our Constitution and subject to the 
sovereign power of Parliament it is the function of the 
courts and not of political bodies to resolve legal 
questions.  The present question seems to me to be very 
much at the political end of the spectrum.78 
It may be noted that on the question of deference, Lord Hoffman had 
a different view.  He referred to the widespread scepticism “which has 
attached to intelligence assessments since the fiasco over Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction . . . .”79  But he said he was willing to accept that 
                                                 
77 Mary Arden Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism, 121 L.Q. REV. 604, 621-22 (2005). 
78 A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, 29 [2005] 2 AC 68 (opinion of 
Bingham, L.J.). 
79 Id. at 94. 
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there was credible evidence that plots for terrorist outrages existed.80  
However, he said that the question was whether there was a threat to the 
life of the nation.81  He went on to say that: 
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, 
which has survived physical destruction, and 
catastrophic loss of life . . . .  The Spanish people have 
not said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime 
as it was, threatened the life of their nation.  Their 
legendary pride would not allow it.  Terrorist violence, 
serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of 
government or our existence as a civil community.82 
He then stated that: 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of the 
people living in accordance with its traditional laws and 
political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws 
such as these.  That is the true measure of what 
terrorism may achieve.  It is for Parliament to decide 
whether to give the terrorists such a victory.83 
Lord Scott said, on the question of deference: 
It is certainly true that the judiciary must in general 
defer to the executive's assessment of what constitutes a 
threat to national security or to “the life of the nation”.  
But judicial memories are no shorter than those of the 
public and the public have not forgotten the faulty 
intelligence assessments on the basis of which United 
Kingdom forces were sent to take part, and are still 
taking part, in the hostilities in Iraq . . . .  I do have very 
great doubt whether the “public emergency” is one that 
justifies the description of “threatening the life of the 
nation”.  None the less. I would . . . be prepared to allow 
the Secretary of State the benefit of the doubt on this 
point . . . .84 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 95. 
82 Id. at 96. 
83 Id. at 97. 
84 Id. at 154 (opinion of Scott, L.J.). 
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4. A Slippery Slope 
Lord Steyn, in a paper on deference, has said that “it cannot be right 
to say that these are issues which constitutional principle withdraws 
from the decision by the courts.”85  He went on to point out that the 
argument in times of emergency, the notion that “we are all on the same 
side as the government,” is a slippery slope which tends to sap the will 
of the judiciary to stand up to a government guilty of an abuse of 
power.86  Principles developed by the courts for extreme situations are 
likely to outlast those situations and be applied in normal times as well. 
E. The Approach of the Supreme Court of India 
In India (a country which has witnessed terrorist acts within its 
borders for fifty years) the Supreme Court has said this about terrorist 
cases: 
Terrorist acts are meant to destabilize the nation by 
challenging its sovereignty and integrity . . . .  The 
protection and promotion of human rights under the 
rule of law is essential in the prevention of terrorism . . . .  
If human rights are violated in the process of combating 
terrorism, it will be self defeating . . . .  To maintain this 
delicate balance by protecting core human rights is the 
responsibility of the courts[.]87 
III.  THE COMMON LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Lord Steyn has also argued that in the United Kingdom prior to the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, fundamental rights of 
individuals had not been adequately protected in the legal system.88  He 
argued that a constitutional democracy must protect fundamental rights.  
He said that “[w]ithout such a moral compass the state is bound to treat 
individuals arbitrarily and unjustly . . . .  By the 1998 Act Parliament 
made the judiciary the guardians of the ethical values of our Bill of 
Rights.”89  He said that the profound change in the legal system was 
                                                 
85 Lord Steyn, Deference:  A Tangled Story,  PUB. L. 346, 355 (2005). 
86 Id. at 359. 
87 [2003] SOL Case No 840. 
88 Lord Steyn, Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom, 2005 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 4, 349, 349. 
89 Id. at 349. 
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emphasised by the decision of the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case.  
He referred in particular to what Lord Bingham said: 
I do not in particular accept the distinction . . . between 
democratic institutions and the courts.  It is of course 
true that the judges in this country are not elected and 
are not answerable to Parliament.  It is also of course 
true . . . that Parliament, the executive, and the courts 
have different functions.  But the function of 
independent judges charged to interpret and apply the 
law is universally recognized as a cardinal feature of the 
modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of 
law itself.  The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist 
on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is 
wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some 
way undemocratic . . . . The 1998 Act gives the courts a 
very specific, wholly democratic mandate . . . .90 
If Lord Steyn is correct in saying that human rights were not 
adequately protected in the United Kingdom before the 1998 Human 
Rights Act, when only the common law applied, then the same is true of 
Australia today.  It is a common law system, with a common law that is 
very close to that of the United Kingdom, prior to the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act.  
There has been much written on the adequacy or otherwise of the 
response of the English courts to the counter terrorist legislation, and 
whether or not the Human Rights Act in England provides adequate 
protection of human rights in the age of terror.91 
A. The Approach of the English Courts is Much Stronger on Human Rights 
Than the Australian Courts 
My purpose in referring to these English decisions is not to provide 
an exhaustive analysis of those decisions and many other related 
decisions.  Rather, my purpose is to draw a distinction between the way 
in which a legal culture informed by domestic human rights legislation, 
and where the courts embrace international law, deals with these issues, 
                                                 
90 Id. at 350. 
91 See generally, Thomas Poole, Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in Times of Crisis, 2008 
PUB. L. 234; Margit Cohn, Judicial Activism in the House of Lords:  A Composite Constitutionalist 
Approach, 2007 PUB. L 95; K.D. Ewing and Joo-Cheong Tham, The Continuing Futility of the 
Human Rights Act, 2008 PUB. L. 668; Lord Lester, The Utility of the Human Rights Act:  A Reply 
to Keith Ewing, 2005 PUB. L. 249; Kim Economides et al., Can Human Rights Survive? A 
Symposium on the 2005 Hamlyn Lectures, 2007 PUB. L. 209. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss3/7
2010] Role in Australian Law 909 
in comparison with the situation in Australia where there is no domestic 
human rights legislation, and where the courts only treat international 
law as relevant at the margin, if at all.  
As a practitioner in the field in Australia, having been involved to a 
greater or lesser extent in three different terrorist cases, I can only say 
that I would have much preferred to have been arguing those cases in 
the English context rather than the Australian context.  
B. The Unprecedented Decision to Order a Retrial in Thomas, on the Basis of 
the Prosecution Seeking to Introduce New Evidence 
In this context it should be noted that in Thomas III, the Victorian 
Court of Appeal ordered a retrial at the request of the prosecution, on the 
basis of new evidence in the form of a television interview recorded 
before the first trial, but aired after the conclusion of that trial.92  There 
was no precedent for ordering a new trial at the request of the 
prosecution on the basis of new evidence, in the United Kingdom, or 
Australia, or Hong Kong, or in the United States.  I doubt whether it 
would have been ordered by an English court.  It was a dramatic 
departure from established principle and a departure in favour of the 
prosecution.  The Court itself acknowledged that its decision was 
without precedent. 
C.  Domestic Human Rights Legislation is Needed in Australia 
In the Thomas case, the jury acquitted Thomas on his retrial.  This 
was a sign that the jury was able to stand back from the war on terror 
rhetoric which has so dominated public discussion since 2001, and forms 
a view about the evidence, or lack of it, presented in court. 
But the Australian system would be significantly enhanced by 
domestic human rights legislation and by the Australian courts 
abandoning their insular view of the world, and embracing international 
human rights law. 
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